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The Future of Regulation 
Dr. Jerry Ellig* 
ABSTRACT 
This paper discusses the prevalence of regulation in the U.S.  It provides 
the necessary background information on the process for creating 
regulations, how scholars can measure the increase in regulation, and the 
different types of regulations.  This paper then goes on to discuss the five 
major recent trends in regulation and the implications of these trends for the 
future. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Do you feel regulated?  On a business trip, your day might start by being 
woken up, not by the alarm clock, but by a phone.  For that call to go 
through on a cell phone, the phone company had to buy a license from the 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to use part of the radio 
spectrum.  There are various rules and regulations governing how that 
spectrum came into being and how it is used.  Moreover, the tag on your 
mattress assures that the mattress complies with Title 16 of the Code of 
Federal Regulations, section 1633, which deals with flame retardant, fire 
proof mattresses.1  Then you get up and go into the bathroom, you take out 
your FDA approved toothbrush, put FDA approved toothpaste on it, and 
brush your teeth.2  You might then reach for a can of shaving cream 
containing only two and a half ounces because, if you flew on a plane, 
regulations from the Department of Homeland Security prevent anyone from 
carrying a full size can of shaving cream on an airplane.3 
Not all of this is necessarily a reason to complain.  Your cell phone 
company was required to obtain a license to use the spectrum, which it 
bought it at an auction run by the FCC.  Auctioning has proven to be a much 
better method of allocating spectrum than some of the other methods 
previously used by the FCC.4  Few people would object to the idea of 
sleeping on a mattress that is flame retardant.  While that regulation may not 
be objectionable, some might consider themselves competent enough to find 
safe toothbrushes and toothpaste and most people would like to know what 
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information the Department of Homeland Security relied on to construct its 
regulations regarding carry-on luggage. 
Simply put, federal regulation touches everyone’s daily lives in many 
ways that most people never bother to think about.  Because regulation is 
extremely pervasive, it makes sense to learn more about how federal 
regulation works, what it does, and to think carefully about the process of 
adaptation and review of regulations. 
II.  HOW REGULATIONS ARE CREATED 
 
Many times in casual conversation the term ‘regulation’ is used to refer 
to any restriction imposed by the government that defines certain actions as 
legal or illegal, but the definition is actually more specific.  Regulation 
occurs when a legislature delegates some of its lawmaking power to a 
regulatory agency, which then issues detailed rules, the purpose of which is 
to carry out the intention of the legislature.  Regulations are issued by a 
regulatory agency, with the intention of filling in the gaps in legislation.  In 
the case of federal regulation, it fills in the gaps left by the U.S. Congress. 
Two kinds of regulatory agencies exist at the federal level in the United 
States.  Many regulatory agencies are actually part of the executive branch 
and their top officials are hired and can be fired by the President.  These 
include agencies, such as the Environmental Protection Agency, the various 
agencies that regulate transportation within the Department of 
Transportation, and any position within a Cabinet department.  All these 
regulatory agencies are directly responsible to the President. 
There are also independent regulatory agencies, that is, agencies that are 
independent of the President, but not independent of Congress.  These 
agencies usually have the word “commission” in their title.  The President 
usually appoints the commissioners, who run these agencies for a fixed term, 
with the consent of the Senate.  The President cannot fire them, and as a 
result, these agencies tend to function relatively independently of the 
executive branch.  They do not necessarily act independently of Congress, 
since Congress ultimately approves the budget and writes the laws that the 
agencies are supposed to implement.  Examples of this type of agency are 
the FCC, Consumer Product Safety Commission, Security and Exchange 
Commission, and Commodity Futures Trading Commission.  The Federal 
Reserve is also considered an independent regulatory agency. 
The most significant difference between the independent agencies and 
the executive agencies is that executive agencies are supposed to operate 
within rules laid out in executive orders.  Democratic and Republican 
administrations issue executive orders and these orders explain how agencies 
ought to analyze regulations.  The White House has the ability to tell these 
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agencies, “No, you can’t issue that regulation, because you haven’t done 
your homework.”  The independent agencies, on the other hand, have not 
traditionally been subject to that kind of oversight by the White House. 
Regulations are made through an organized process.  There must be 
authorization in legislation for a regulatory agency to enact a piece of 
regulation, and it must be empowered to issue a particular regulation by 
Congress.  The agency must issue any proposed regulation for public 
comment, and it will take comments on the proposed regulation for an 
average of sixty to ninety days.  It will then rewrite the proposed regulation, 
and issue its final regulation.  The regulation may go through several rounds 
of proposals and revisions.  The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 
reviews regulation produced by executive agencies, both before it is released 
for comment and before it is officially published.  Finally, before any agency 
publishes a regulation, Congress is able to review that regulation.  Although 
Congress could nullify any regulation at any time, it also has an expedited 
process for reviewing regulations under the Congressional Review Act.  This 
Act allows Congress the power to quickly veto a proposed regulation or to 
veto a final regulation after it is published by the passage of a joint 
resolution by a simple majority.5  The Congressional Review Act has only 
been invoked once in history. 
Finally, regulations can be appealed to the courts.  When one is affected 
by a regulation, one can seek reprieve from the courts if a regulatory agency 
exceeded its authority, the regulation is arbitrary, or the process of creating 
the regulations is flawed.  Regulations must be in accordance with certain 
rules.  There is an organized process for issuing regulations, and there are 
opportunities at various points for members of the public, to have some 
effect on what regulatory agencies do. 
As individual citizens or as members of other organizations, the public 
can comment on proposed regulations to the OMB when it is reviewing a 
regulation.  The public can make its views known to Congress, which 
ultimately writes the laws, and, if someone is directly affected by the 
regulation, he or she may have standing to challenge that regulation in court.  
If someone else challenges a regulation in court, a citizen can file an amicus 
brief, or friend of the court brief, offering some information or commentary 
on the regulation. 
III.  HOW MUCH REGULATION IS THERE ON THE FEDERAL LEVEL? 
 
There are many ways of measuring regulation, and all of them are 
inaccurate.  Do not take the evidence too seriously, or literally.  Measures of 
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regulation reveal the big picture, and whether regulation has been increasing 
or decreasing.  Other than that, these measurement methods are all inexact. 
Traditionally scholars have tried to measure the amount of regulation by 
the number of pages in the Federal Register (Figure 1), because the Federal 
Register is where agencies have to publish most proposed regulations and 
where they have to publish final regulations.  This method does not 
necessarily measure the volume of effective regulation because deregulatory 
action, as well as regulatory action, must go into the Federal Register.  
However, it does give a decent idea of the total amount of regulatory activity 
that agencies engage in. 
FIGURE 1: PAGES IN THE FEDERAL REGISTER: 1936–2001 
Source: UCSD Vote View6 
Regulatory activity increased during the World War II, and increased 
again in 1972.  In President Nixon’s second term, it ramped up 
tremendously, hitting a peak in the final year of the Carter presidency, and 
falling somewhat under President Ronald Reagan.  Regulation resumed 
growth under President George H.W. Bush, continued growing under 
President Clinton, and then leveled off under President George W. Bush.7 
There are other ways to looks at regulatory trends.  One technique is to 
look at regulatory agency expenditures in the Federal Budget.  These do not 
measure the total cost of regulation; they only measure what the Federal 
Government is spending to administer regulations.  In both of these 
measures, there is actually a similar pattern, showing where regulation has 
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waxed and waned, sometimes rapidly, sometimes slowly.  Once again, by 
this measure there is a bit of a dip during the Reagan years, and then a huge 
spike under President George W. Bush, which most largely reflects the 
increase in regulations regarding national security.8 
Similarly, by counting the number of people in the Federal Government, 
who are involved in regulation, follows a pattern somewhat similar to the 
pattern of expenditures.  There is a big jump right after 2001.9  That reflects 
the federalization of the air traffic screening force.  Private contractors, who 
worked for the airlines, formerly conducted airport security, but the Federal 
Government took over screening and this added approximately sixty-
thousand federal employees.10 
These measures generally track each other, albeit imperfectly.  During 
the Nixon and Carter years, the amount of regulatory activity increased 
faster than the amount of spending.  This is also demonstrated by graphing 
the number of personnel.  In terms of Federal Register pages, federal 
regulators became more productive during the Nixon and Carter years 
because they were able to produce more pages per person.  Regulation has 
gradually been growing, but there have been some fluctuations in the trend.  
This fluctuation is evident when examining the number of Federal Register 
pages versus the number of regulatory staff. 
Another way of measuring the amount of regulation is by looking at the 
total cost against the total benefit of regulation.  There are several ways of 
measuring this and all of them are inaccurate.  One of the best ones comes 
from the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs within the OMB.  
Every year they are required by law to produce an annual estimate of the 
costs and benefits of federal regulations.  The estimate they released in 2009 
said that the benefits of regulation are somewhere between $126 billion and 
$663 billion, and the costs are between $51 and $60 billion.  However, this 
is not the total benefit and cost of all federal regulations.  Rather, this is the 
total benefit and cost of federal regulations proposed within the past ten 
years.  The total will arguably be a lot higher on both the cost side and the 
benefit side. 
The other odd thing about the OMB estimate is the method behind the 
estimation.  The estimate uses the cost and benefit projections that were 
calculated by federal agencies when they proposed these regulations.  In 
reality, this is a measure of the costs and benefits that agencies anticipated 
when they proposed the regulations.  This is not a measure of the actual 
costs or the actual benefits that occurred after the regulations were 
implemented.  However, the officials that author the report acknowledge 
these shortcomings. 
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Another attempt to measure the cost of regulation is undertaken by the 
Small Business Administration’s Office of Advocacy.  The Office of 
Advocacy promotes regulation polices that benefit small businesses.  They 
commission an academic to report on the total cost of federal regulation and 
examine how it affects small businesses verses large businesses.  Professor 
Mark Crain led the most recent report which estimates that the total cost of 
regulation is around a $1 trillion or $10,000 per household.11  The study has 
been criticized on a number of grounds, but the picture, from either the 
OMB figures or Mark Crane’s study, indicates the substantive effect of 
regulation, regardless of the problems in the studies. 
IV.  TYPES OF REGULATION 
 
There are different types of regulations.  Economic regulation involves 
government control of prices, entry, setting quality standards for products 
and services, and establishing other contract terms, but that is not the most 
common type of regulation.  Health and safety regulation is the largest single 
portion of regulation in terms of federal activity.  Workplace health and 
safety regulations or other kinds of health and safety regulations, such as all 
of the Homeland Security regulations are intended to make people healthier 
or safer.  An FDA approved toothbrush is an example of a health and safety 
regulation. 
There are also environmental regulations.  Some are intended to 
improve health and safety, such as getting particulates out of the air because 
.particulates can cause significant health problems.  But, other 
environmental regulations are not as linked to human health and safety and 
come from to a broader desire to protect the environment.  For example, 
there are regulations that intend to protect endangered species.  The link 
between endangered species and human health and welfare is tenuous.  The 
values driving those regulations were not whether the regulations protecting 
endangered species make humans healthier, but rather, to protect endangered 
species, since eliminating other species is wrong. 
There are civil rights regulations that prevent people from 
discriminating based on race, religion, and other factors.  There is not a huge 
amount of federal money spent on these regulations.  Much of the 
enforcement of these results from lawsuits in the private sector, but that is an 
important part of regulation.  The three previously mentioned categories, 
health and safety, environmental, and civil rights, are often grouped together 
and referred to as social regulation. 
In contrast to social regulations, there are transfer regulations.  These are 
regulations issued by agencies that spend money or collect taxes.  The 
regulations these agencies issue lay out how they are going to collect taxes 
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or how they are going to spend money.  This is a little different from some 
of these other types of regulation.  Much of the way the money is spent is 
driven by formulas written into the legislation and then the agency is 
responsible for issuing regulations that implement and update that formula 
when they distribute the money.  Federal disaster aid is administered in this 
way and the Federal Emergency Management Administration has to issue a 
set of regulations and ground rules outlining how people can apply for that 
disaster aid.  These types of regulations elaborate on how the Federal 
Government spends money. 
V.  IMPORTANT TRENDS IN REGULATION 
 
Five important trends in regulation are essential to understand.  The first 
major trend is a reduction in certain types of economic regulation.  Many 
graphs of federal spending on industry-specific economic regulation come 
from a publication called the Regulator’s Budget.  This is jointly assembled 
every year and updated by the Mercatus Center and the Weidenbaum Center 
at Saint Louis University.12  Money spent on industry-specific economic 
regulation increased throughout the sixties, but in the seventies it started 
falling.  It bounced up a little bit, and then bounced down, but a big drop-off 
persisted throughout the 1970s and into the 1980s. 
These trends largely reflect the decisions to deregulate prices and entry 
in transportation industries like railroads, trucking, airlines, communications, 
telecommunications, and certain energy industries.  For example, the Federal 
Government no longer controls the price of natural gas.  The price is set 
through competition in the market.  Much of the scholarly research in the 
1960s and the 1970s on a cluster of infrastructure industries demonstrated 
that the principal effect of government regulation in these competitive 
industries was to enforce cartels, enforce monopolies, and overcharge 
consumers.  This is why the two principal political figures who pushed the 
deregulation of those industries in the 1970s, particularly the transportation 
industry, were President Jimmy Carter and Senator Ted Kennedy.  Senator 
Ted Kennedy was the principal sponsor of the airline deregulation bill. 
The figures on regulatory personnel show a similar effect because there 
was a big reduction of regulatory personnel who were involved in industry-
specific regulation.  Almost all of the academic research, whether it is by 
economists who are on the left, the right, or in the middle, agreed on the 
impact of this regulation.  In studies by the Brookings Institution in 
Washington D.C., economists suggested that deregulation benefits 
consumers with large price decreases and other significant benefits, such as 
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improvements in the quality and timeliness of service.  When economists 
have quantified the effects in 1995 dollars, it totaled around $60 billion per 
year.  At current prices, these figures rise to approximately $75 to $80 
billion in annual benefits that consumers get from lower prices and better 
service as a result of the deregulation that has occurred in these industries.  
This is driving the reduction in spending and personnel on economic 
regulation. 
The OMB’s guidance documents for regulatory agencies also 
encapsulate the conventional wisdom of economists with regard to 
government regulation of prices.  In terms of service in competitive 
industries, the OMB guidance to agencies says, “in light of both economic 
theory and actual experience a particularly demanding burden of proof is 
required to demonstrate the need for any of the following types of 
regulations.”13  Essentially, regulations of prices, quantities, quotas and 
aspects of industries could be competitive.  The highest levels of officials in 
the Federal Government who review federal regulation accept that economic 
regulation that puts government in the business of enforcing cartels and 
monopolies does not benefit consumers.  Such types of regulation should 
raise suspicions, unless there is some other public interest or reason besides 
the effects on prices and consumer welfare.  Ultimately, one major trend is 
the sizeable reduction in economic regulation. 
The second trend is a very large increase in social regulation, 
particularly in the areas of health and safety regulation and environmental 
regulation.  Federal spending on social regulation has continued to gradually 
increase since President Nixon’s term, with only a slight decline under 
President Reagan.  Similarly, the number of people involved in social 
regulation has generally increased over time with the only anomaly 
happening during the Reagan years.  The findings in these reports do not 
reflect the furious battles in Washington D.C. over environmental regulation, 
which along with health and safety regulation, have continued to gradually 
increase. 
The third trend is an increase in national security regulation.  This type 
of regulation has seen the biggest jump of any kind of regulation.  Yet again, 
most of that surge relates to the federalization of the screening workforce in 
airports.  After 9/11, national security related regulations increased, whereby 
either new regulations came into existence, or existing regulations became 
more stringent.  The same type of pattern can be observed when examining 
Homeland Security regulatory personnel.  President Obama’s 2009 budget 
provides projections through 2010 and for an increase in funding of the 
Department of Homeland Security, though the rate of increase is slightly 
lower than during the President George W. Bush’s Administration.14  It 
seems the increase in national security regulation was not an anomaly that 
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occurred only under President George W. Bush, but rather that, Homeland 
Security spending is permanent. 
The fourth trend is the appearance of midnight regulation.  This has 
been researched by a number of colleagues at the Mercatus Center, including 
one who even spent some time in the Federal Government trying to curb this 
trend.  There are various ways of measuring this, but the general 
phenomenon is the tendency for regulatory activity on the federal level to 
become concentrated in the final quarter of a President’s final year in office, 
hence the term midnight regulation.  Much of this regulation occurs after the 
election and before inauguration day, as seen in Figure 2.15 
FIGURE 2: NUMBER OF SIGNIFICANT RULES REVIEWED AND MONTH 
RECEIVED 
Source: Patrick A. McLaughlin, “Empirical Tests for Midnight Regulations and Their Effect on 
OIRA Review Time.”16 
This trend is consistent among both Democratic and Republican 
Presidents, so it is not a partisan trend.  It tends to be the most common 
either at the end of a president’s eight year term, because then the President 
is really a lame duck and will not be serving again, or when control of the 
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Presidency switches from one party to another.  The term midnight 
regulation was likely coined during the Carter Administration and has only 
really been examined since that time, but each President partakes in this 
activity to some degree or another at the end of his second term.17 
Midnight regulation is not inherently good or bad.  The real issue is 
whether each President is issuing good, well thought-out regulations toward 
the end of his term.  Some argue that trying to do a whole lot in that short 
period of time may be a bad thing for two reasons.  First, since most of that 
activity occurs between Election Day and inauguration day, the outgoing 
president is not accountable to anybody for his actions.18  From a democratic 
perspective, we must evaluate the merits of surges of activity in an 
administration when it is very clear the President is leaving office and can do 
whatever he wants without fear of penalty from the electorate.  The other 
reason to think carefully about whether midnight regulation is advantageous 
is the need for time to review regulations at the Office of Management and 
Budget.  The OMB is responsible for analyzing regulation carefully to make 
sure that agencies understand the costs as well as the benefits.  If agencies 
are trying to do too much at one time, they may not be thinking carefully 
about what they are doing.  Similarly, the reviewers in the administration 
become swamped with a lot of work at the same time and may not be able to 
think as carefully about it as they normally would.19 
Substantial regulations that have a large effect on the economy are 
referred to in federal regulatory parlance as “economically significant 
regulations.”  This term refers to regulations that have an economic impact 
of more than $100 million, measured in terms of costs, benefits, or federal 
spending.20  The midnight regulation phenomenon holds true for 
economically significant regulations as well.  Figures about economically 
significant regulations are only available since 1981 because it was Reagan’s 
executive order that created the classification called economically significant 
regulations.  President George H.W. Bush, President Clinton, and President 
George W. Bush all saw a large spike in economically significant 
regulations at the end of their Presidential terms.21 
This is problematic because a quick examination of the resources 
available to the office charged with reviewing these regulations for the 
President, the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, shows that its 
budget has pretty much declined steadily from its original level of around 
$10 million in 1981.  This figure grew a little bit under Reagan because 
Reagan was a strong proponent of this kind of review, and increased a little 
under George W. Bush.  But, generally, the Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs has seen declining resources to review regulations even 
though the number of people in that office has been fairly constant in any 
given year.22 
[Vol. III: 67, 2010] The Future of Regulation 
PEPPERDINE POLICY REVIEW 
77 
With these big spikes in regulation concentrated in one quarter, it is 
logical to assume that the people who are supposed to review these 
regulations for the President are not able to spend as much time on each 
economically significant regulation during the midnight period, as they 
spend at any other time.   
As seen in Figure 2, under President George W. Bush, the amount of 
midnight regulation seems to be lower than under President Clinton or 
President George H.W. Bush.  One reason for this is that the White House 
Chief of Staff, Joshua Bolten, issued a memo toward the end of the 
Administration telling federal agencies that the White House would be 
clamping down on midnight regulations.  All proposals of new regulations 
would have to be submitted by June in order to be able to be processed by 
the end of the presidential term.  Consequently, what happened under  
President George W. Bush  is that midnight regulation was smoothed out a 
little bit, as some of that regulatory activity was pushed back into the 
summer and spring of the election year, rather than having it all concentrated 
at the end of the election year.  Susan Dudley, a former colleague at the 
Mercatus Center, who headed the Office of Information and Regulatory 
Affairs for the last two years of the Bush Administration, deserves much of 
the credit for the research on midnight regulation.  She has written on 
midnight regulation and entered the Bush Administration committed to 
trying to reduce the effects of midnight regulation. 
The fifth trend is the probable increase in regulation of financial 
companies as a result of the recent financial crisis.  The important thing to 
keep in mind is that there will be two kinds of regulation of financial 
companies.  Some regulations will relate to things that people think might 
have caused the financial crisis.  For example, there are contracts called 
credit default swaps, which are essentially a way of buying insurance when 
you own a portfolio of mortgages and allows you to hedge against some of 
the risk that those mortgages will default.  Some people think that these 
played a role in the financial crisis and there have been moves to require that 
all credit default swaps have to be traded on exchanges where they are more 
public and more highly regulated.23 
Another example is the proposal floating around to give the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) the authority to shut down financial 
firms that are close to being insolvent even if they are not banks.  The FDIC 
would be allowed to wind them down the same way that the FDIC shuts 
down banks that are insolvent or close to being insolvent.  Some people 
think if the FDIC had possessed that authority, the FDIC might have caught 
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some of these financial firms before they lost so much money, and therefore 
negating the need for a bail out.24 
On the other hand, we are also going to see increased financial 
regulation that has nothing to do with the causes of the financial crisis.  For 
example, there is a proposal to create a Financial Consumer Product Safety 
Commission that will evaluate all financial products and tell consumers 
which financial products are safer for consumers to buy.25  Aside from the 
merits of this proposal, it is important to keep in mind that this is a proposal 
that has been around for several decades.  People in Washington D.C. have 
wanted to do this before, and the financial crisis is simply an excuse for 
doing something that they wanted to do anyway. 
Similarly, those who use credit cards may have read the inserts that 
come in credit card bills and tell you how the terms of credit card 
agreements are going to change.  In some ways, changes may make things 
better for consumers; in other ways, it may make things worse.  These 
changes are the result of new federal regulations.26  The idea behind federal 
regulations on certain types of credit card companies has been floating 
around for quite some time, and the financial crisis was just an excuse to 
enact them. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
There are two conclusions we can draw from these trends.  First, 
regulation is a growth industry.  For those who are either students in public 
policy programs or interested in public policy that means that there is an 
ever-increasing demand for people who understand how to assess and 
analyze the effects of regulation.  The second is that there are ways that the 
public can get information in front of regulatory agencies that may affect the 
decisions of regulatory agencies.  Therefore, all hope is not lost because 
there are opportunities for all of us to be involved in the regulatory process 
in one way or another, and hopefully create better regulatory decisions. 
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